Seven days of speech at home and with family

In his own notes (the Be'er Mayim Chaim) he says that this very thing is in Avot de-Rabbi Natan, an early companion to Pirkei Avot (the Mishnah's Ethics of the Fathers), at the end of chapter 7. As he quotes it, the passage explains the Mishnah's words about a husband's talk with his wife (Avot 1:5). How so? When a person comes to the study hall and is not treated with honor, or has a dispute with his fellow, he should not go and say to his wife, "This is how I argued with my fellow." He disgraces himself and disgraces his fellow, and his wife, who used to honor him, stands and laughs at him.

He adds that someone who tells such a story tells it so that it sounds right, and so that the wrong is on the other side. He says this to explain why it does not help that the thing happened in front of others. In our scene the teller also adds a line that was never said. Where something false is mixed into the telling, and the person is shamed the more for it, he rules that it is motzi shem ra, giving a person a bad name, and the sin is far greater (Lashon Hara 1:1).

He gives the same rule for a business partner who tells his partner that certain people are, in his opinion, not to be trusted. He points to the Gemara (the Talmud, Kiddushin 52b), where Rabbi Yehuda tells his students not to let the students of Rabbi Meir in, because they are quarrelsome. Even something he has only heard he may pass on as a warning for the future, although he may not believe it as settled fact. Then he must choose his words:

"But otherwise," he writes, "there is no difference at all." In a note elsewhere (Lashon Hara 10:14), on a person who tells others of a wrong done to him, he suggests that telling it in order to ease the worry in his heart may perhaps also count as a purpose for the future, as long as the other conditions listed there are kept. That note came up in week 2. How it meets this paragraph is a question for a rav (rabbi).

This is from Shmirat HaLashon, his second book on speech, at the start of his chapters on machloket, quarrel. The pairing of this passage with today's law is ours.

In his own notes (the Be'er Mayim Chaim) he writes that all of this is learned from the story of Yosef (Joseph) and from the story of Miriam, "who was his sister." Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe: "Was it only with Moshe that Hashem spoke? Did He not speak with us too?" (Bamidbar, Numbers, 12:2). Hashem is the name used here for God. The Sifrei, an early midrash (the Sages' teachings on the verses), says that Miriam spoke only when Moshe was not present, and for Moshe's benefit (Sifrei Devarim 275).

The Chafetz Chaim explains. They did not mean to run Moshe down. In their view he had acted wrongly in separating from his wife, Tzipporah, and they agreed that they should reprove him for it, which means correct him. They were punished, he writes, because the matter was settled in their eyes, and they should not have decided for the time being, as long as they had not asked him the reason. He adds that Moshe did not mind, as it says, "The man Moshe was very humble" (12:3), and even so Miriam was struck with tzaraat, a skin affliction the Sages connect to lashon hara. More of this is in the last teaching of this week.

The words "if he erred" could be read as leaving room wherever the relative is right. His notes close most of that room. The condition, he writes, applies only to a matter between one person and another, when the teller means to stand up for the truth, and he sends the reader to chapter 10 for that law in all its details. Outside such a case, his note says, it is forbidden whether he was right or wrong, as he wrote in chapter 4. The first condition in chapter 10 is that he saw the thing himself and did not hear it from others, unless it was later made clear to him that it is true (10:2).

The Chafetz Chaim brings this in Shmirat HaLashon, his second book on speech, from the Midrash (Devarim Rabbah 6:9; the Midrash as printed on Sefaria has the name as Rabbi Yehuda ben Levi). A few lines later in the same paragraph, on Miriam, the text sends the reader to his notes on chapter 8 of the Chafetz Chaim. The note there that deals with Miriam is the first, on today's law. Setting the line about a brother beside today's law is ours.

In his own notes (the Be'er Mayim Chaim) the source is Yosef (Joseph): "And Yosef brought a bad report about them to their father" (Bereishit, Genesis, 37:2). Yosef's intent, he writes, was that their father Yaakov (Jacob) should reprove them, as the commentators wrote, and even so he was punished measure for measure, as the Midrash (the Sages' teachings on the verses) says. Rashi, the classic commentator, brings it on that verse: Yosef told his father three things about his brothers, and was struck in all three.

A note of his own then allows that this proof can be answered. One could say, he writes, that Yosef was punished because he was mistaken, and in truth his brothers had done no wrong, as the commentators wrote. Even so, he concludes, the law in the main text is true, and he points to his notes on chapter 10, on reproving a person before telling others about him.

The paragraph ends: unless he judges that his reproof will not help, "then it is permitted." He lists no conditions here. His other rulings do, and bringing them here is ours.

Telling a person's relatives so that they will correct him is for a case where he will listen to them, and the teller's whole intent must be for the sake of Heaven, not dislike of him over something else (4:5, on a wrong between a person and God). His note there adds that the teller must see that the relatives will believe him. It warns him to think it over very carefully first: relatives mostly do not believe such a thing at all, it can only end in great quarrels, and then it is better to hold back and not tell.

For a wrong done to another person he lists seven conditions (10:2). The first is that the teller saw the thing himself and did not hear it from others, unless it was later made clear to him that it is true. Others are that he did not judge it in haste, and that he adds nothing to it. He also has a rule of its own for someone who knows that his reproof will not be accepted (10:7). That is a separate rule, not a condition on today's paragraph. For a real case, ask your rav (rabbi).

The parable below is from Shmirat HaLashon, his second book on speech. It is not about a brother and his own father. A man's son has done something wrong, and another person goes and makes it known in public, in front of many people, where the father sees it. The father then speaks to that person. The father is his figure for Hashem (God), and the son for any Jew. Setting the parable beside today's law is ours.

The chapter is on the mitzvah (commandment) "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra, Leviticus, 19:18). After the parable he says what it stands for: Israel are the Creator's children, "You are children of Hashem your God" (Devarim, Deuteronomy, 14:1), and this person shames His child in front of people for no purpose. Just before the parable he writes that someone who sees his fellow doing what the law does not allow must tell him privately and reprove him, and so keeps the mitzvah of reproof. In today's law the teller means well and tells only the father, so the two cases are not the same.

The Chafetz Chaim adds in parentheses that this must be done respectfully, "as I wrote in the Be'er Mayim Chaim," his own notes. He goes on: if he kept silent before them, he and they are punished severely for it. In the notes he quotes Tanna d'bei Eliyahu (chapter 21): a person should not see his father and mother speaking needless talk and keep silent, and if he does, he and they do not live out their days and years.

Then the caution. He must not tell them that they went against the Torah, and the Chafetz Chaim points to the Gemara (the Talmud, Kiddushin 32a). There, a child who sees his father go against the Torah does not say, "Father, you went against the words of the Torah." The Gemara concludes that he says, "Father, there is a verse in the Torah that says this." The Shulchan Aruch, the standard code of Jewish law (Yoreh De'ah 240:11; this reference is ours), rules that he says it as though asking, not as though warning, so that the father understands by himself and is not shamed.

The Chafetz Chaim's own wording for this case, in the notes: he should say, softly and respectfully, that even if it is true, it is written in the Torah that one may not speak lashon hara about one's fellow in any case, and add points in that person's favor, until he stops them. In a note elsewhere (6:4) he writes that with a speaker who will only run the person down more, silence at that moment is better. How these fit together, and what to say to your own father or mother, is a question for a rav (rabbi).

He rests this on the Gemara (Shabbat 54b): whoever is able to protest against the members of his household and does not is held to account for the members of his household.

This is from Shmirat HaLashon, his second book on speech, and it gives the listener's own reason: so that their stories at home do not trap him into accepting, which means believing, lashon hara. He ends that paragraph with a reference to chapter 8 of the Chafetz Chaim. Sefaria's text has paragraph 4 there. The matching words are in paragraph 14, today's law, which seems to be what is meant. Reading it that way is ours, and so is the pairing of this passage with today's law.

This is from his laws of lashon hara (negative talk about someone), in a paragraph about a person who hears one man speaking lashon hara about another. A note of his on today's paragraph says that the same law applies to one's teacher, and points to this paragraph. In his own notes there (the Be'er Mayim Chaim) he brings a proof from the Gemara (the Talmud, Moed Katan 16a). There the sage Rava asks how we know that when a court's messenger is treated with contempt, and comes back and reports it, this is not seen as evil speech. He answers from a verse, the words of Datan and Aviram, two men who rebelled against Moshe (Moses): "Will you put out the eyes of those men? We will not come up" (Bamidbar, Numbers, 16:14).

The Chafetz Chaim reasons from there. He goes by the wording of this Gemara that two early commentators, the Rosh and the Ran, had. In that wording the report is rechilut: the messenger told Moshe what Datan and Aviram had said about him. Moshe was the teacher of all Israel, and his honor is weightier than a father's. Even so, the Gemara holds that it would have been forbidden to tell him, if not for the rule about a court's messenger. And it does not help, he adds, that the messenger wanted to stand up for the truth.

This is the second half of today's paragraph, and he says people stumble in it. A father then hits the young boy out of great hatred, he writes, and from that comes a great quarrel between the two fathers. He rules that if the teller does not know for certain who was in the right, it is forbidden to tell the father of either one. And even if he knows for certain that one of the boys was in the right, he should still not tell the father of the second, he writes, unless the conditions of chapter 9 are met. Those are his laws of telling a person something in order to save him from harm. For a real case, ask your rav (rabbi).

This is from Shmirat HaLashon, his second book on speech, in a chapter on keeping out of a quarrel even when that means not taking the side of one's father or mother. The line is from a note of his about a son who sees that his father is in the right, and should still try to quiet the quarrel. The Sifrei is an early midrash (the Sages' reading of the verses), and the verse it reads is Devarim (Deuteronomy) 13:7. In his notes on Rechilut 3:3 the Chafetz Chaim uses the same line of the Sifrei for a law next to ours: it is rechilut to tell a son what was said about his father and mother, because he will at once hold it in his heart against the one who said it. Setting the passage from Shmirat HaLashon beside today's law is ours.

In his own notes (the Be'er Mayim Chaim) he explains what is different about the wife and relatives. It is forbidden, he says, to tell even an unrelated person what one man said about another, in case it reaches him, "for your friend has a friend." The difference is the case in the main text, where the listeners were warned to tell no one and nothing in fact got out. With an unrelated listener, in such a case, there is no prohibition of rechilut. With the wife and relatives there is, for the reason in the main text: they themselves will hold it against So-and-so. He adds that today's law holds even where nothing bad is heard about either man, for example where each has an argument that he is in the right. Where something bad is heard, it is at any rate lashon hara (negative talk about someone), and forbidden in every case, even with an unrelated listener. And in his laws he rules that one must be careful not to tell such a thing even with a warning, and even when sure that the listener will keep his word, because in most cases something bad is heard about one of them (Rechilut 3:3).

That is the same law from the other side: there, the family was spoken about and the man is told. The reason is the same in both places. In today's law it is in the main text: the family will hold it in their hearts against the one who said it. On this paragraph it is in his notes: the father will at once hold it in his heart against him, even if he was warned not to tell his son.

In Shmirat HaLashon, his second book on speech, the Chafetz Chaim is describing a person caught up in a machloket, a quarrel, who brings suffering on his own children and draws his household into it. Datan and Aviram rebelled against Moshe (Moses) in the wilderness; the verse about their tents is Bamidbar (Numbers) 16:27. The pairing of this passage with today's law is ours: a tale told to a family makes the grievance the family's.

What was done: tzaraat, which he calls a very hard punishment. The person struck with it must stay outside all three camps of Israel, he writes, which is not so for others who are impure. To whom: the passage above and the one under "Read it in his words." He adds that the well that gave Israel water in the wilderness rose in her merit, and that the Torah calls her a prophetess (Shemot, Exodus, 15:20). That she only put Moshe on a level with other prophets is the Rambam's line (Maimonides), at the end of his laws of tzaraat. The Torah gives the words as Miriam's and Aharon's together: "And they said: Was it only with Moshe that Hashem spoke? Did He not speak with us too?" (Bamidbar, Numbers, 12:2).

"The building of the world" is a phrase from the Sifrei, an early midrash (the Sages' reading of the verses), which says that Miriam spoke when Moshe was not present, "for Moshe's benefit, for the praise of God and for the building of the world" (Sifrei Devarim 275). Another passage of the Sifrei (Sifrei Bamidbar 99) gives the background: Miriam had learned that Moshe had separated from his wife, and she spoke, it says, "not to lessen being fruitful and multiplying, but to increase it."

Where: on the way. Her great merits, he writes, did not gain her a delay until Israel made camp somewhere, when it would have been less noticed. It happened while they were traveling, and so everyone knew: "and the people did not travel until Miriam was brought back in" (Bamidbar 12:15).

When: on leaving Egypt. It was at the start of the second year, he writes, when the greatness of the punishment for this was not yet known to all. Later came the spies, the men Moshe sent to scout the Land. Their sin was much greater, he writes, because they had seen what happened to Miriam and did not take the lesson, and that is why their story follows hers in the Torah, as Rashi, the classic commentator, explains (on Bamidbar 13:2).

He then draws the lesson himself (12:5). Today, he writes, all of us are like "hyssop on the wall," a small plant, next to Miriam the prophetess. A person who does not guard himself from lashon hara, even if it is only like what Miriam did, and all the more if he speaks on purpose to shame his fellow, will surely not be clean, he writes, of the great punishment of tzaraat or of other punishments in its place. One who always remembers it in this way, he writes, will surely be saved from this sin.

He is quoting the Ramban (Nachmanides), a sage of the 1200s, who counts this among the commandments. Before that he brings an early midrash that reads "remember" as saying it aloud. He cites it as the Sifrei. The line is in the Sifra, the midrash on Vayikra (Leviticus), and the Ramban, in the passage he quotes, brings it from there.

Then he raises a difficulty himself. We see people speak lashon hara right after saying "remember," and sometimes while saying it. So where is the Torah's advice?